Authorization architecture
Keyra authorizes.
Wallet / custodian executes.
What you see is what you authorize.
Conceptual diagram where not yet implemented. Material property changes invalidate authorization.
Proposed authorization flow
Conceptual — not yet implemented
- Wallet constructs transaction intent
- Deterministic transaction hash created
- Authorization request sent to Keyra
- Trusted Keyra device receives request
- Human reviews amount, destination, network and fees
- Hardware-rooted authorization produced
- Wallet/custodian executes through existing key/MPC path
- Result linked to authorization evidence
- Audit record preserved
What you see is what you authorize
- Transaction intentthen
- Deterministic serializationthen
- Hashthen
- User presentationthen
- Hardware authorizationthen
- Authorization recordthen
- Executionthen
- Executed transaction comparisonthen
- Audit evidence
If amount, asset, destination, network, source wallet, contract, function, or call data changes materially, authorization must be invalidated and repeated.
You are authorizing
250,000 USDC
- From
- Treasury Wallet
- To
- 0x72F…98D
- Network
- Ethereum
- Destination
- Verified Business
- Estimated fee
- $14.22
- Requested by
- Treasury System
- Security requirement
- Keyra Hardware Verification
Amounts are illustrative. Value-moving actions never use ambiguous OK / Yes / Continue labels.
Absolute commands
Never collect private wallet material
01
No seed phrases
Never ask for or store a seed phrase.
02
No private keys
Never ask for, store, or log a private key.
03
No analytics leakage
Never place private material in analytics or crash reports.
04
Reject bad architectures
If a third party requires unnecessary exposure—stop.
Continue with wallet integration patterns
Provider-neutral adapters. Conceptual interfaces labelled.
